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Abstract: Contentious politics have led to regime downfall or
democratization of many countries. Today, China is faced with
increasing numbers of contentions politics. However, Contentious
politics in China does not result in regime change because the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) manages protests by keeping it fragmented
and small in scale. It achieves this primarily through structural and
institutional means, but is willing, to resort to violent repression if a
protest movement becomes too widespread. This paper is divided into
four parts. First part is a backgrounder, giving stats to show that
protests are frequent but small in scale. Second, I will argue that
China’s weak institutions – labour union, media, and internet –
preclude small-scale protests from becoming large, cohesive
movements. Third, I will argue that the government in China is
structured in such a way that grievances are pursued at the local level;
therefore, regional protests are unlikely to become national
movements. Finally, even if protest become large and target the
central government, the CCP is capable of suppressing protests using
military, and police, as a last resort.
Keywords: China, Contentious Politics, Authoritarian Resilience, the
Chinese Communist Party
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Introduction
Throughout history, contentious politics have led to regime
downfall or democratization of many countries. In the early 1900s,
devastations of WWI caused many protests that targeted the
government. Eventually, popular demonstrations led to the regime
collapse, and it created Fascists States – Germany and Italy – and the
Communist Soviet. In a more recent event, protests led many
authoritarian regimes to democratize during the Arab Spring of 2011.
Contentious politics bring political change because
concerted resistance can force a government to change (Friedman and
Taylor 2012). However, Chinese government shows this is not always
the case. Although the number of contentious politics has been
steadily increasing in China, the government preserves its status quo
by keeping protests small. Researchers suggest that even though the
absolute number of protests has been increasing, the proportion of
cases with 100 or more participants has been declining (Cai 2010). In
1993, 16.1% out of 8,700 protests had 100 or more participants;
however, in 2003, 12% out of 58,500 protests had more than 100
participants (Cai 2010). In addition, only 5% of petitions from
industrial sectors in 1999 had more than 100 participants and none of
it had more than 500 people (Cai 2010).
Unlike the democratic movements that transformed many
states of Europe and the Middle East, contentious politics in China
does not force its government to change. The Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) controls institutions to keep protests independent from
each other, the central government dodges protestor’s rage by
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blaming the provincial government, and the CCP uses physical force
to suppress movements if necessary. These points will be elaborated
on using three subsequent parts. In the first part, I will argue that
China’s weak institutions – labour union, media, and internet –
preclude small-scale protests from becoming large, cohesive
movements. Second, I will argue that the government in China is
structured in such a way that grievances are pursued at the local level;
therefore, regional protests are unlikely to become national
movements. Finally, even if protests become large and target the
central government, the CCP is capable of suppressing protests using
military and police as a last resort.
Weak Institutions that Represent Protestors
China’s small-scaled protests can be explained by weak
institutions – labour union, media, and internet – that otherwise might
turn small, regional movements into national ones. The Chinese
labour union has not been successfully leading large-scale workers’
protests because they are largely controlled by the government.
China’s sole labour union, All-China Federations of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) represents 280 million workers, but its leadership
appointment is based on his/her connection with the party rather than
his/her relationship with labourers. Consequently, unlike other
countries – the U.S, Canada, and the Western Europe –, who elect its
union leaders from pool of working class, the ACFTU leaders have
been appointed from bureaucrats. For example, Wang Zhaoguo who
served as the ACFTU Chair in 2002, had a career in Taiwan Affairs
Department for seven years (Friedman 2014). Li Jianguo, who was
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the Chair between 2013 to 2018, served ten years as a provincial party
secretary of Shaanxi before coming to the office (“Li Jianguo” n.d.).
The current leader of the ACFTU, Wang Dongming, was the party
secretary of Sichuan province between 2012 and 2018. (“Wang
Dongming” n.d). More importantly, these leaders jointly held the
ACFTU Chair position while serving as the Vice-Chairman of the
National People’s Congress (NPC). Due to union leaders’
bureaucratic background, lack of experiences with labourers, and
political interest, the labour union ensures that protests are isolated
from the society and do not pose a threat to the regime.
Moreover, the media is unwilling to spread information,
which restrains protests to become larger in scale. According to
Esarey (2005:54), the Chinese media is described as the “party’s
mouthpiece as well as an industry.” The party retained firm control
over media industries through appointments of top-level managers.
The Propaganda Department and the CCP Organization Department
have been appointing top-level managers whose career prospects
were based on the loyalty to the party. Although managers needed to
produce media contents that are attractive to consumers, they had to
censor politically sensitive topics (Esarey 2005). For example,
Xinhua and many other state media did not cover large protests in
Wukan village until a couple of months later, when they started to
praise how the provisional government handled the incident
effectively (“China’s State-Run Newspapers Praise Government
Handling of Wukan Protest” 2011). Knowing the media-state
connections, citizens are reluctant to approach media for criticizing
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the state. According to a survey conducted by Cai (2008:97), “only
less than 5% of citizens chose to approach media when they had
conflicts with state authorities.” Therefore, media is used as a tool by
the government to control the flow of information and is viewed as
untrustworthy by the public. This censored media makes protests
regional, isolated, and small in scale.
Furthermore, the CCP is capable of controlling the internet
that could disseminate information widely and precipitate regional
protests. Therefore, the CCP has been maintaining stringent control
over the internet, which is sometimes called as the Great Firewall of
China (Barne and Ye 1997). Li Yonggang, a Chinese scholar,
compares hydroelectric water-management system to China’s
internet control that includes censorship, surveillance, and
manipulation of information (Mackinnon 2011). For example, the
central government ordered China’s largest websites, Sina.com and
Baidu, to censor information by deleting, blocking, or banning certain
topics or keywords (Mackinnon 2011). During the Chinese prodemocracy protests in 2011, also known as the Jasmin Revolution, the
central government ordered to block the word “jasmin” and prevented
further spread of information that could facilitate larger movements
(Jacobs and Ansfield 2011). Moreover, during the Xinjiang ethnic
riots in July 2009, the CCP cut off the internet in the entire province
for six months to prevent protests from becoming widespread
(Mackinnon 2011).
State-Local Separation of Responsibility
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The CCP legitimizes its leadership through state-local
separation of responsibility. Most protestors target local governments
instead of the central government because of this split in their duties.
Due to decentralization of power and cadre evaluation system, local
governments are primarily responsible for handling disputes.
Meanwhile, the central government moderates conflicts between
local officials and protestors with the petition and the court system.
This directs dissident’s anger toward local governments while the
central government arbitrates disputes to gain favour over distressed
citizens.
Since the early 1990s, China’s institutional decentralization
started to put much more responsibility on local governments in
handling daily issues, which directly put them in conflict with local
citizens.

Especially

after

the

fiscal

decentralization,

local

governments started to take a primary role in expanding their budget,
but many ended up having major disputes with citizens. For local
governments, land expropriation has been the fastest way to generate
revenue because governments can stimulate the local economy with
real estate developments. Chinese constitutions make land
expropriation much easier for local officials because village cadres
have the deciding vote regarding land use within a village (Cai 2010).
However, these processes often result in creating direct conflict
between local governments and its citizens. For example, in Shantou
city in Guangdong province, large numbers of peasants attacked
homes of village cadres in more than ten villages because
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demonstrators were suspicious of cadre’s corruption in land sales (Cai
2010).
In addition, demonstrators target local officials because local
governments are primarily responsible for resolving disputes under
the cadre evaluation system. The CCP established three performance
targets for the political promotion: the veto targets, which prioritize
social stability; hard targets, which focus on economic growth; and
soft targets, which include long term issues such as health care and
education (Ong and Gobel 2014). Even an outstanding performance
that meets hard targets and soft targets can be discredited if local
officials fail to meet the veto target that is largely concerned with
protests. Therefore, local cadres prioritize dealing with protestors,
which include concessions and repression. Their strategies vary
depending on forcefulness of action (scale of resistance) and cost of
concession (financially). Yongshun Cai (2010) argues that when there
is a forceful resistance group that demands a low financial cost, most
local governments make financial concessions; however, when there
is a weak resistance group that demands a high financial cost, most
local governments use the physical force to repress. In cases where a
weak resistance group that demands for a low concession, usually
local governments does not respond (Cai 2010). In all of these cases,
local governments are the primary contacts in resolving disputes. As
a result, protestors target local governments for the grievances that
governments created while demanding for the compensation.
In the midst of disputes between local cadres and citizens,
central government legitimizes its leadership by opening up
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alternative channels – the petition and the court system – for citizens
to appeal their demands. Petitioning the central government has been
recognized as a constitutional right since the late 1970s in China (Li,
Liu, and O’Brien 2012). After Hu Jintao announced improvement of
the petition system to accommodate more citizens, the number of
petitioners increased dramatically between 2003 to 2007 (Li et al.
2012). During this period, the petition office handled 10 million cases
annually (“Complaint Bureau busiest office in Beijing” 2007). The
effectiveness of the petition system in resolving disputes still remain
minimal because the central petition office sends most cases back to
the local level. However, the petition system has been successful in
legitimizing the central government by appearing to take the initiative
to resolve citizens’ concerns. Furthermore, the CCP recently made
improvements in the court system in order to legitimize its leadership.
The legal system has been more effective in resolving disputes than
petitioning. According to the China General Social Survey, 27% of
total disputes were channeled through legal actions in 2005 (Cai
2010). Many cases, such as mediation and arbitration of labour, have
been resolved through the court system (Cai 2010). There are still
limitations to the court system because the court is not independent
from the CCP and therefore hard to criminally punish party officials.
However, the court system is increasingly becoming more effective
in resolving civil litigations (Cai 2010).
Consequently, data shows that most Chinese citizens favour
the central government much more than local governments.
According to the World Values Survey China in 2012, the satisfaction
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scored for the central government was 76 out of 100, while village
level governments were at 54 (Tang 2016). Furthermore, in terms of
level of trust, central government officials scored 83 points while
village level officials and county officials scored 54 and 60
respectively (Tang 2016). Both results show that citizens favour the
central government and its officials far better than local government
and its associates. Other research that measures the government
dissatisfaction after imposing unpopular policy provides a similar
result. When the policy dissatisfaction increases from minimum (0)
to maximum (1), the dissatisfaction with village level governments
increases by 51.7%, county/city level governments by 48.5% but it is
much smaller in the central government by 29.1% (Tang 2016). It
shows that dissatisfaction with policies affect the credibility of local
governments much more than the central government. Due to the split
in the state and local responsibilities, protestors target local
governments instead of the central government, thereby protecting the
legitimacy of the state.
State’s Capacity
Overall, China’s weak institutions and its localized
governing structures prevent small, regional protests from becoming
large national ones. When these mechanisms fail, however, and
national protest movements arise, the government uses force as a last
resort. The state is capable of suppressing large scaled demonstrations
using military and police. In the early years of the CCP, the party used
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to suppress movements that
could pose a threat to the regime’s stability. After winning the civil
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war against the Kuomintang, who fled to Taiwan after the defeat, the
PLA’s primary goal shifted to restoring order in the newly created
People’s Republic of China. In 1959, massive demonstrations
occurred in Lhasa, Tibet that demanded Tibetan autonomy, and this
has posed a significant threat to the CCP. Tibetan Uprising was ethnic
in nature with the goals of protecting Tibet’s culture and religion
(Norbu 2001). The movement had a strong leader, Dalai Lama, and
the protest was large-scaled with more than 300,000 participants
(Norbu 2001). The CCP ordered over 30,000 PLA troops to enter
Tibet and suppressed demonstrators by killing 87,000 Tibetans
(Norbu 2001). Similarly, in 1989, Tiananmen protest in Beijing posed
a significant threat to the regime’s stability. The protest was large with
nearly a million Beijing residents (Zhao 2001). It criticized the
dictatorial regime while demanding for a democracy, and
demonstrators were from various sectors of the society ranging from
police officers, lower party officials, youth league, working-class, and
professionals (Zhao 2001). The protest again was suppressed by the
PLA after the CCP declared Martial Law. Nearly 300,000 troops
began severe suppression of demonstrators, which resulted in
thousands of casualties (Thomas 2006). For the CCP, the PLA saved
the regime from collapsing during these massive protests. It was
possible because the first-generation leader, Mao Zedong, and the
second-generation leader, Deng Xiaoping, had stringent control over
the military while on their duty as the General Secretary (Kiselycznyk
and Saunders 2010).
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Since the early 1990s, the People’s Armed Police (PAP)
replaced the role of the PLA in controlling mass demonstrations. The
Tiananmen incident marked the turning point for the PAP when the
CCP started to acknowledge the necessity for the strong public
security force that could focus on social instability. Consequently,
between 1989 to 1992, the PAP budget expanded by 45% from 1.1
billion USD to 1.6 billion USD (Sun and Wu 2008). Within ten years
after the Tiananmen incident, the PAP developed into a nation-wide
armed force with more than 1.1 million members (Sun and Wu 2008).
Meanwhile, the CCP maintained strict control over the PAP through
an institutional structure of the CCP that authorizes the State Council
and the Central Military Commission to directly oversee PAP’s
operations (Sun and Wu 2008). When there were large scaled
demonstrations that local governments could not handle, the central
government ordered the PAP to effectively suppress such movements.
For example, when 100,000 protestors were mobilized against the
Sichuan Dam project in 2004, 10,000 PAP troops were deployed and
put an end to the movement (Haggart 2004). Similarly, during the
2011

pro-democracy

protests,

upsurge

of

cross-regional

demonstrations between twelve to thirteen cities were stopped by
180,000 PAP troops and 560,000 security volunteers (“China arrests
more activists for urging protests” 2011).
Conclusion
Contentious politics, in and of themselves, do not necessarily
threaten the stability of an authoritarian regime, so long as they are
kept fragmented and small. Furthermore, even large scaled
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demonstrations do not naturally mean the collapse of regime, as long
as the state is capable of controlling the military and public security
forces to suppress such movements. The CCP has been effectively
controlling the labour union, media, and internet to prevent the spread
of protests, and kept them isolated from the general public. Although
there were few incidents that mass demonstrations became
widespread, the CCP was capable of using the PLA and the PAP to
suppress such movements. Despite the significant control over the
society, most Chinese view the CCP as positive. It is largely because
of the split in responsibility between the state and local government
where local officials take primary role in creating and resolving
disputes. Consequently, most protests target local governments while
the central government dodge criticisms by presenting itself as a
neutral arbitrator. Therefore, despite the rising numbers of
contentious politics, China still remains as one of the most durable
authoritarian regimes today.

52

References
Barne, Geremie R. and Sang Ye. 1997. “The Great Firewall of China.”
Retrieved March 8, 2017 (https://www.wired.com/997/06/
china-3/).
Cai, Yongshun. 2008. “Social Conflicts and Modes of Action in
China.” The China Journal (59): 89-109.
Cai, Yongshung. 2010. Collective Resistance in China. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
“China arrests more activists for urging protests.” 13 March 2011.
Emirates 24/7. Retrieved on 8 March 2017 from (http://www.
emirates247.com/news/world/china-arrests-more-activistsfor-urging-protests-2011-03-13-1.367480).
“China’s State-Run Newspapers Praise Government Handling of
Wukan Protest.” 21 December 29011. Bloomberg News.
Retrieved March 3, 2017 from https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2011-12-22/china-s-state-run-news
papers-praise-government-handling-of-wukan-protests
“Complaint Bureau busiest office in Beijing.” 2 September 2007.
China Daily. Retrieved March 3, 2017 from
(http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/200709/02/
content_6142475.htm.)
Esarey, Ashley. 2005. “Cornering the Market: State Strategies for
Controlling China’s Commercial Media.” Asian Perspective
29(4): 37-83.
Friedman, Eli. 2014. Insurgency Trap: Labor Politics in Postsocialist
China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
Friedman, Patri and Brad Taylor. “Seasteading: Competitive
Governments on the Ocean.” Kyklos 65(2): 218-235.

53

Haggart, Kelly. 2004. “High tensions in Sichuan dam standoff.”
Probe International.
Retrieved March 8, 2019 (https://journal.probeinter
national.org/2004/11/08/high-tension-sichuan-damstandoff-2/).
Jacobs, Andrews and Jonathan Ansfield. 10 May 2011. “Catching
Scent of Revolution, China Moves to Snip Jasmine. The New
York Times. Retrieved March 2, 2017 (https://
www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/world/asia/11jasmine.html).
Kiselycznyk, Michael and Phillip C. Saunders. 2010. “Civil-Military
Relations in China: Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite
Politics.” Institute for National Strategic Studies China
Strategic Perspectives (2):1-41.
“Li Jianguo.” (n.d.) China Vitae. (n.d.). Retrieved on March 2, 2017
(http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Li_Jianguo%7
C261).
Li, Lianjiang, Mingxing Liu, and Kevin J. O’Brien. 2012.
“Petitioning Beijing: The High Tide of 2003-2006.” The
China Quarterly (210): 313-334.
Mackinnon, Rebecca. 2011. “China’s Networked Authoritarianism.”
Journal or Democracy 22(2):32-46.
Norbu, Dawa. 2001. China’s Tibet Policy. LDN, UK: Curzon Press.
Ong, Lynette H. and Christian Gobel. 2014. “Chapter 5: Social Unrest
in China.” Pp.178-213 in China and the EU in Context:
Insights for Business and Investors, Edited by Kerry Brown.
LDN, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sun, Ivan Y., and Yuning Wu. 2008. “The Role of the People’s
Armed Police in Chinese Policing.” Asian Journal of
Criminology 4(2): 107-128.

54

Tang, Wenfang. 2016. Populist Authoritarianism. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
“The Tibetans.” University of Southern California. Retrieved on 7
March
2017
(http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/
database/Tibet/tibet.pdf).
Thomas, Anthony. 2006. “The Tank Man.” PBS Video. Retrieved
March 7, 2017 from (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
frontline/film/tankman/).
“Wang Dongming.” (n.d.) China Vitae. (n.d.). Retrieved on March 3,
2019 from (http://www.chinavitae.org/biography/Wang_
Dongming).
Zhao, Dingxin. 2001. The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society
Relationships and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

55

